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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the historical development of the relationship between the Putin
regime in Russia and the Chávez and Maduro regimes in Venezuela. Key differences and
similarities in their foreign and domestic policies are explored, as well as how they interact with
each other on the world stage. It makes the case that chavismo in Venezuela has lead to
increasingly autocratic policies as oil prices have declined and leadership has changed hands,
changing the character of Venezuela and Russia’s relationship into one that closely resembles the
patron-client relationships of Latin American caudillismo.
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I. INTRODUCING THE REGIMES
When Hugo Chávez became President of Venezuela in 1999, he declared his victory to
be the beginning of a Bolivarian revolution. In doing so he invoked Simón Bolívar, a 19th
century Venezuelan general who had defeated the forces of the Spanish Empire and for a time
ruled a vast South American confederation encompassing Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and
Venezuela. Despite Bolívar’s charismatic leadership, the confederation of Gran Colombia
collapsed and formed five different nations. Before his death, Bolívar placed the blame for his
failure squarely on the shoulders of caudillismo, a form of government dominated by mutually
beneficial but inherently unequal patron-client relationships that confounded attempts at South
American unification. Caudillismo gets its name from the caudillos (military strongmen) that
created these patron-client relationships between themselves and local leaders. Ironically, in
2015, almost two decades after Chávez declared himself Bolívar’s heir, Chávez’s appointed
successor Nicolás Maduro would lead Venezuela into a patron-client relationship with one of the
21st century’s most dangerous caudillos: Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The Putin and Chávez regimes were initially drawn together as allies through shared
geopolitical interests and ideological opposition to the United States. Chavismo (the style of
government employed by Chávez and his followers) was uniquely well suited for an alliance
with the Putin regime. This relationship changed radically in 2014 when Venezuela’s leadership
crisis was compounded with a sharp downturn in oil prices. Unable to recover from either crisis,
Maduro’s regime now has a patron-client relationship with Vladimir Putin. This mutually
beneficial, yet inherently unequal, relationship has solidified Putin as Maduro’s most important
ally and indeed one of his only allies. Russian support is sustaining the Maduro regime, and
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influencing how Venezuelan governance is shifting toward a more autocratic model. In this
paper I will explore what Chavismo is, why the chavista system made Venezuela an ideal ally for
Russia, and what characterizes the new patron-client relationship between the Putin and Maduro
regimes.
II. NATURAL ALLIES
Chavismo is a complicated ideology and form of government, but one of its most basic
principles is aggressive and public opposition to the extension of U.S. influence on the world
stage. This explicit rejection of a U.S.-dominated global system carried a great deal of risk, but it
served to ingratiate first the Chávez and then the Maduro regime with President Putin. One of the
cardinal rules of operating within Putin’s system was that a threat must always originate, “from
1

an external or foreign source.” The chavista regimes have operated much the same way,
perpetually linking the members of the Venezuelan opposition to the U.S. and accusing them of
not being true Venezuelans, but rather professional protesters being funded by foreign interests
2

in order to wage, “economic war”. This determination to blame the U.S. and its allies for all
internal problems, of course, limited Russia and Venezuela’s options for international
cooperation. In 2004, in the midst of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, Chávez visited the
Kremlin and cemented a close alliance with Moscow. After some expertly crafted anti-U.S.
speeches and denunciations of NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe, Chávez had impressed
Putin enough to conclude several landmark deals. The entire Venezuelan military was converted
to Russian technology, a massive undertaking and a very profitable one for Putin. Russian energy
3

companies were also invited to invest heavily in Venezuela.

Maxim Trudolyubov. "A Guide to Getting Along in Putin's Russia." The New York Times, Apr 16, 2018.
David Smilde, "The End of Chavismo?" Current History 114 (769)(2015): 50.
3
Mark N. Katz, "The Putin-Chavez Partnership." Problems of Post-Communism 53 (4)(2006): 5.
1

2
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While the Chávez and Putin regimes were closely aligned in terms of foreign policy, they
differed greatly in governing strategies and styles. Where Russian elections were reserved and
formulaic affairs designed to emphasize stability and continuity, those organized by Chávez were
bombastic, populist affairs aimed at whipping his political base into a frenzy. Where political
opposition parties in Russia were tightly controlled in by Putin, the Venezuelan opposition was
able to oppose Chávez and Maduro openly and loudly and even to win electoral victories.
Despite this difference, the structure and methods of Chavismo actually contributed to the
strength of Russia and Venezuela’s current relationship. Chávez’s fourteen years in power laid
the groundwork for a crisis, forcing the Venezuelan government to choose either serious
concessions to the opposition or a Putinesque campaign of repression if it was to survive.
Putin’s domestic policy was calculated to discourage high levels of mass mobilization
4

and political action. In contrast, Chavismo demanded constant mass mobilization for elections
that were given a great deal of fanfare and news coverage. These elections, presented as free and
5

fair, were seen as constant referenda on the Chávez presidency. Large-scale poverty-reducing
social programs sustained by state oil profits were the foundation of Chavismo and that could be
6

relied upon to produce an outpouring of enthusiastic support come election day. These populist
policies were augmented with an extensive state propaganda apparatus that included, “five
television channels, dozens of radio stations, electronic networks and websites, and massive
7

propaganda on the streets…” Chávez was a perpetual guest in every Venezuealan home. His

4

Allen C. Lynch, "The Influence of Regime Type on Russian Foreign Policy Toward “the West,” 1992–2015."
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49(2016): 106-107
5
Margarita López Maya. 2014. "Venezuela: The Political Crisis of Post-Chavismo." Social Justice (4)(2014): 70.
6
Smilde, "The End?", 49.
7
Maya, “Post-Chavismo”, 70.
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message was consistently for them to mobilize in support of his government agenda. Where
Putin relied on large scale repression of the opposition, Chávez relied on drowning them out.
Despite differences in electoral strategy, in hindsight the system Chávez built now seems
designed to fall back on a Putin-style autocracy as soon as the charismatic leadership and/or the
vast oil wealth of the chavistas faltered. Shortly after his rise to power, in a move reminiscent of
Putin’s cronyism Russia, Chávez took over most independently organized community councils
and projects in Venezuela. These groups were integrated into a vast system of state patronage, so
that even local fundraisers and environmental projects owed their funding and organization to the
8

president himself. At the national level, Chávez took advantage of majorities in the legislature
and friendly members of the judiciary eroded the powers of both branches, making it very
9

difficult for them to enact substantial checks on the president’s power. Chávez also considerably
weakened the opposition media by either buying up unfriendly outlets or simply imprisoning
opposition journalists, courses of action that would be utilized even more liberally under
10

Maduro. This undermining of the competitive political sphere so deeply entrenched the
chavistas and so intensely alienated the opposition, that any peaceful transfer of power would
have been extremely difficult to achieve.
Difficult though a transfer of power would be, Chávez left Maduro with few options. In
addition to leaving him a government structure that could not easily be converted to genuinely
competitive politics, Chávez also left him with a brewing crisis that obliterated the widespread
popularity of Chavismo. Under Chavez the state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A
(PDVSA) was the key to maintaining popular support. As long as oil profits sustained social
8

Maya, “Post-Chavismo”, 71.
Maya, “Post Chavismo”, 79.
10
Freedom House, "Freedom of the Press: Venezuela.", 2015.
9
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programs, Chavismo remained ascendent. Yet despite PDVSA’s central position in Chávez’s
grand strategy, he left it in complete disarray after years of mismanagement. After countering a
2005 strike with mass layoffs in middle and upper management positions, Chávez never invested
11

sufficient resources to train replacement managers.

The state oil company was also saddled

with many other state projects such as food distribution and housing construction. These extra
responsibilities forced it to put off important repairs and updates that were needed to keep the oil
projects safe and running at full capacity. Extraction facilities became so overworked and
inefficient that PDVSA would often to buy oil on the world market just to fill their customer’s
12

orders on time. Maduro is left unwilling to sacrifice the concentration of power left to him by
Chávez and unable to recover from the 2015 drop in oil prices with PDVSA in shambles. The
failure of state programs and the government’s harsh crackdown on protesters left Maduro
profoundly unpopular, failing to live up to the landslide victories Chávez regularly achieved
13

during his lifetime.

Chavismo’s initial success and anti-U.S. politics made a Venezuela-Russia alliance
initially viable. The failure of Chavismo served to bring them even closer together. Legitimizing
elections, expansive state programs funded by oil profits, and the appearance of a level political
playing field were all vital aspects of Chavismo. Those cornerstones crumbled, and Maduro’s
solution was a campaign of nationwide repression reminiscent of Putin’s consolidation of power.
A key difference is that Putin’s consolidation occurred when oil prices were going up and the
national mood was at least somewhat hopeful. Maduro’s increasingly repressive behavior bred
only resentment and economic uncertainty. Such repression served to further isolate Venezuela
11

Maya, “Post-Chavismo” 74-75.
Maya, “Post-Chavismo” 74-75.
13
DatinCorp. 2018. Cohesión-País Venezuela;. Caracas, V.
12
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on the world stage, dramatically increased civil unrest, and made Putin’s support all the more
vital to Maduro’s survival.
III. PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
There is a distinction between the patron-client relationships that typify caudillismo and
the concept of “client states.” In the language of Latin American politics, a patron-client
relationship simply means an alliance that benefits both sides, but with the two clearly not on
equal footing. The Putin and Maduro regimes are part of an inherently unequal patron-client
relationship, but this does not make Venezuela a client state. This unequal partnership was not
the result of threats or domineering policies on the part of Putin. Rather, it was a result of the
extreme crisis that Venezuela is embroiled in and the resources Putin was willing to expend to
sustain his ally.
In the aftermath of Chávez’s death in 2013 and the drop in oil prices in 2014, the far less
charismatic Maduro has been taking steps to solidify his position. 57% of the population reported
in 2018 that if given the chance they would flee the country. Maduro could not rely on the old
14

populist strategies of Chávez. As discussed earlier, Putin and Maduro both justified their more
autocratic actions by blaming the imperialistic designs of the United States, subverting them
from within and following the opposition. Despite the similarity in rhetoric, Maduro watched his
popularity evaporate while Putin’s position became increasingly secure. In these differing levels
of danger from the general public we can see one of the key differences between Putin and
Maduro’s situations, and one of the main reasons their relationship developed as an unequal on.

14

DatinCorp, Cohesión-País Venezuela.
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Putin was far more successful in silencing or co-opting the Russian opposition than Maduro was
with its Venezuelan equivalent.
A critical chavista strategy for undermining Venezuela's political opposition has been to
portray opposition groups as out of touch and elist. When oil prices were high and Chávez made
regular speeches this was highly effective. When Maduro found himself isolated from the
populace however, the danger an organized opposition coalition posed to his regime became
more apparent. Accusing his critics of being agents of Washington was not been sufficient to
silence their campaigns against the regime. Indeed, many opposition leaders regularly traveled to
the U.S. to speak out against the Maduro regime and request aid before returning to run for
15

office. Such a strategy is hard to imagine for members of the Russian opposition who do not
want to campaign in exile. Even with all the consolidation of power the chavistas achieved at the
national level, Maduro is to this day “protested loudly” when he visits the National Assembly to
16

support legislation. The idea of Putin being “protested loudly” in any Russian government
building when “periodic murder” of opposition journalists in Russia is common seems far
17

fetched indeed. The chavista regime could afford to allow for many public freedoms when it
was popular, but the structure of Chavismo ensured that those freedoms could not survive the
decrease in chavista popularity that would accompany an economic downturn. Putin, on the other
hand, never needed solely rely on his own popularity to keep his position secure. As long as this
is true, Maduro will always be playing second fiddle to Putin.
The benefits of stalwart Russian financial support induced Maduro to accept the position
of unequal partner. In 2017 alone Maduro’s regime was saved from defaulting on its debt three
Smilde, “The End?”, 52.
Maya, “Post-Chavismo”, 79.
17
Lynch, “Regime Type”. 107.
15
16
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separate times by last minute Russian loans. Beyond extending critical loans, Putin allowed
Caracas to put off paying back large Russian loans during times of crisis. Because Venezuela
pays these loans back in oil reserves, temporary leniency allowed more Venezuelan crude to be
18

sold for a profit on the world market. Krauss observed, “Russia is effectively taking China’s
place as Venezuela’s principal banker. While President Hugo Chávez was in power, China lent
Venezuela tens of billions of dollars for projects to be paid for with oil. But China quietly
19

stopped making new loans [after 2015], leaving Russia to fill the void.” The benefits to each
side are clear. Putin expects that once Maduro’s regime stabilizes he will have access to
extensive Venezuelan oil reserves that he has now essentially purchased at a bargain price. For
his part, Maduro needs a lenient financial backer if he is going to have any chance of
consolidating power.
An additional benefit for Maduro was having the international propaganda apparatus of
the Russian state, which had already gained some legitimacy among disaffected U.S. Americans,
mobilized on his behalf. One of the most successful branches of this machinery is Russia Today,
an English language news network that claims to present a legitimate alternative to U.S. news
sources. In reality, Russia Today is completely controlled by the Kremlin and organizes its
20

reporting around advancing Putin’s political aims. Evidently, the Kremlin is more than happy
to report Maduro’s propaganda as fact. A popular news segment done in the vein of The Daily
Show called Redacted Tonight with Lee Camp dedicated a segment in 2018 to “Why the U.S.
wants Venezuela to collapse.” During this time slot one of Chávez’s old advisers, Eva Golinger,

Clifford Krauss, "Russia Says it Will Ease the Debt Burden on Venezuela." The New York Times (Online), Nov,
2017
19
Krauss, "Rosneft".
20
Peter Pomerantsev,. 2014. Nothing is true and everything is possible : the surreal heart of the new Russia. n.p.:
New York : PublicAffairs, [2014], 42.
18
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came on the program to decry U.S. subversion of Venezuelan prosperity, defending election
fraud and violent suppression of protesters through her insistence that the U.S. does the same
21

thing and therefore cannot criticize Maduro for protecting himself. A written article also
produced by Russia Today and also written in English entitled “Can Russia & China Rescue
Venezuela?” included false information intended to portray Maduro as more secure than he
actually was at the time of the article. The article claimed that China was working together with
Russia and against the U.S. to ensure Maduro’s regime does not collapse. According to the
article, China was too invested in Maduro to allow him to fall, when in fact China refused to
continue dealing financially with Maduro long before the article was released, as shown earlier
22

in this paper. Given that U.S. sanctions continued to hamper Venezuela’s economic recovery, it
is not hard to imagine why Maduro would want to see Russia Today’s audience take up the cause
of his government.
Venezuela also has a wide array of state controlled media outlets. One of
Maduro’s key mouthpieces has become the newspaper El Universal, which was an opposition
23

newspaper until a group of anonymous investors purchased it. After being acquired by its new
owners, El Universal b ecame been a staunch friend to Putin. The two incidents that cast a
shadow over Putin’s 2018 reelection, the tragic fire in a Kemerovo mall and the poisoning of
ex-Russian spy Serguéi Skripal, were both reported on by El Universal. The articles could have
been dictated by the Kremlin’s chief spin artists, portraying Putin as every bit the stable,
determined, all powerful man he wishes people to see him as. An article about the fire paints
Putin as an enraged champion of the people descending on Kemerovo demanding an explanation
Why the US Wants Venezuela to Collapse. R
 edacted Tonight, Moscow, Russia: Russia Today, 2018.
Carlos Garcia Rawlings, "Can Russia & China Rescue Venezuela?" Russia Today, Mar 28, 2018.
23
Freedom House 2015. "Freedom of the Press: Venezuela."
21
22
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24

and promising an investigation while local officials quail and beg for forgiveness. An article on
the poisoning follows a similar formula, giving minimal information on Skripal and instead
focusing on how calm and ministerial Putin looked when facing down accusations from British
25

Prime Minister Theresa May, whom the article portrays as out of control and hysterical. While
Putin surely appreciated this, it is unlikely that he requested it. Integrated as he now was to the
chavista ideology, protecting his image was a priority for the Venezuelan state media.
This illuminates another aspect of the patron-client relationship. It became unequal in
part because Putin simply had more to offer in some areas. Having an influential
English-Language news station reporting favorably on Maduro within a country that is aligned
against him was undeniably a bigger boon than the Venezuelan press agreeing to follow the
Kremlin line.
IV. WHERE MADURO IS HEADED
There was a time when Venezuela seemed ascendent and the wealth generated from oil
made many things seem possible. Chief among them was exporting the Bolivarian revolution
abroad. This vision of a new multipolar world led Venezuela to be explicitly anti-U.S. while still
seeking to be accepted as a modern state by the international community. This led to a
Venezuelan bid for a seat on the UN Security Council and at least nominal concern for being
26

seen as protecting human rights. As has already been seen, a vital part of Chávez’s strategy was

"Putin Promete Castigo a Culpables Del Trágico Incendio En Un Centro Comercial Siberiano."El Universal, Mar
27, 2018.
25
"Presidente Ruso Vladimir Putin Mantiene La Calma Ante Acusaciones Sobre El Envenenamiento Del Ex Espía."
El Universal, Mar 25, 2018
26
Ralph S. Clem and Anthony P. Maingot. 2011. Venezuela's Petro-Diplomacy : Hugo Chávez's Foreign Policy
Gainesville : University Press of Florida, 2011, 11-17.
24
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winning what appeared to be free and fair elections consistently. The dream of a global
Bolivarian revolution required that Venezuela be seen as a stable alternative to U.S. dominance.
This practice however, has been shown to have been considered luxury by the chavista
regime. Like many other luxuries, it was discarded as soon as Venezuela's one major export was
not bringing in funds as it once had. Economic crisis has led Chavismo to fall back on its basic
structures, which are now revealed to be steeped in tactics of repression and patronage. With
much of its leverage with the international community slipping away along with its control over
its own oil, the Maduro regime is less concerned each day with foreign affairs and more with
how to protect itself at home.
As discussed above, Maduro has become more authoritarian as his popularity has slipped.
His tactics have become more violent, including a call to his supporters to arm themselves and
27

attack opposition protesters. Supporting Maduro through all of this is his patron: Vladimir
Putin, who has already invested billions in propping up the regime.
When we consider the implications of Putin’s growing influence in Venezuela, it should
not be seen in the context of some sort of domino effect. Venezuela is not Putin’s beachhead in
Latin America upon which he will build an empire. He did not seek to destabilize Venezuela, but
rather made an investment that he is willing to see through for geopolitical reasons. To
understand the situation, it must be examined in an international context free of the regional
restrictions utilized by many during the Cold War. Maduro and Putin’s relationship makes much
more sense in this international context. The Maduro regime benefits the Russian president as an
ideological and economic ally in a geopolitical campaign to lessen U.S. dominance abroad. Putin

27

Smilde, “The End?”, 54.
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is willing to gamble a great deal of Russian capital to keep a stalwart, anti-U.S. leader afloat, and
that leader has become demonstrably more autocratic the more reliant he becomes his patron.
This is a patron he knows will not desert him no matter what sorts of atrocities he might commit
domestically. By examining the underlying structures and rhetoric of other seemingly stable or
democratic nations, we can anticipate which would be prime new clients for Venezuela’s new
caudillo should their system fail as well.
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